Private equity is not an easy industry to grasp. And yet it affects the lives of millions. They need to be convinced. This is a media war and must be fought with media tools: enter the soundbite.

The institutions that invest in public markets also invest in private equity funds. A decision to sell shares in a quoted company to a private equity buyer is one made by these institutional investors. No one forces them to say yes. Private equity has made a lot of money out of delisting businesses. But if there is an imbalance that must be redressed, it is that public companies should be made more efficient, not private companies less so.

Private equity firms make money by building companies and by incentivising managers to run them more efficiently. Selling off non-core operations can bolster core businesses, while paying attention to the efficient management of property and other tangible assets is in the interests of all.

In countries where there is an offset of tax against interest on debt, every company benefits. It is not confined to private equity. Also, the treatment of management incentive as a capital gain is entirely correct. Managers involved in buyouts have a lot to lose, as well as gain.

Private equity default rates are running at virtually zero. Also, huge amounts of money have been made for the employees and managers of private equity-backed businesses through efficient cash and balance sheet management practices. Key to this is the smart use of debt, negotiated on terms that give companies plenty of headroom and push out repayment for years to offset risk. Public market companies are now starting to gear up in a similar way, proving the attractiveness of the private equity model. The idea that equity is good and debt is bad is economic illiteracy.

When Jon Moulton offered to buy Rover in 2000, the proposed redundancy package per worker was £46,000. The government bowed to public pressure and turned him down. Four years later the same workers lost their jobs and walked away with around £2,000. Moulton’s offer would also have left the pension scheme fully funded. Instead the employees received the meagre protection fund entitlement, and £450m in liabilities fell to the public purse. Private equity faces up to economic reality faster than many other business owners. Delay in decision-making ultimately destroys more jobs, more value and more lives.

As Keynes said: “Of the maxims of orthodox finance, none, surely, is more antisocial than the fetish of liquidity.” Indeed it is the very illiquidity that allows private equity to take a longer-term view of business than the public markets currently do.

Private equity firms are answerable to a roster of professional institutional managers. In return for their money, such managers demand the highest level of disclosure and reporting possible. Disclosing information on private businesses to satisfy the curiosity of the general public is not in the interests of the business, it employees or its stakeholders.

The private equity model requires investors to sell businesses within a set time frame. This instils a discipline that ensures each company is intensively managed and demonstrably improved within five to seven years. Another difference is that private equity portfolio companies are treated as separate legal entities and are not liable for the losses of any other.

Europe's venture capitalists are partners with the companies in which they invest and feel the highs and lows just as keenly.

There is a whole ecosystem of equity providers, ranging from start-up venture capital firms to the mega buyout houses that dominate the headlines. As firms migrate up the spectrum, others fill their place. If you can't raise money, you don't deserve it.

Taking on venture capital is about bringing in a partner, not selling out. It is not how big your slice is, but the size of the cake that counts.